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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Turkish pharmaceuticals industry is increasingly becoming dependent on imports. The 
domestic industry sees parallel trade as the key to increasing exports to the EU in order to 
cover the increasing imports. However, the parallel trade is not permitted for Turkish 
wholesalers by the Association Council Decision No 1/95. This study aims to examine 
whether the opening of parallel trade could really be a cure to the industry or whether 
there is another trend in the EU that the Turkish industry should follow as well.  
 
Parallel trade in pharmaceuticals is a highly debatable issue in the EU. Parallel trade in 
general is encouraged by the Commission, mainly because it is thought to contribute to 
the achievement of the single market. However, concerning specifically the 
pharmaceutical market, there is an ongoing discussion between the pharmaceutical 
industry and the Commission on whether this industry has any special characteristics 
which makes it different from the other industries. The pharmaceutical industry defends 
that its parallel trade has the result of benefiting only the importer and harming the 
industry, consumers and the government health system. The Commission is emphasizing 
on the other hand that pharmaceutical products are not different than the other products 
when it comes to parallel trade. In this regard, the Commission kept on taking decisions 
finding infringements of Article 81(1) EC when manufacturing companies engage in 
agreements with their wholesalers prohibiting exports or restricting supply. In line with 
the Commission’s established case-law regarding other products as well as 
pharmaceuticals, the concept of an agreement has been defined very broad, including 
even the wholesalers’ tacit acquiescence with manufacturer’s policy of preventing 
parallel imports in the absence of a written agreement. Although the Commission was 
accused by some scholars of using the rules on competition law excessively in order to 
achieve the integration of the single market, these decisions were upheld by the European 
Court of Justice up to the Bayer decision1.  
 
 
1 96/478/EC, Commission Decision of 10 January 1996 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EC 
Treaty (Case IV/34.279/F3 - ADALAT), OJ L 201/1, 09.08.1996 (hereinafter: “Bayer decision”). 
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The judgment of the Court of First Instance2 in Bayer3 which is recently upheld by the 
European Court of Justice4 on 6 January 20045 has been welcomed with enthusiasm 
among the European pharmaceutical industrialists. It is now believed that there is a way 
out for preventing parallel trade which the companies has long been accusing of being 
detrimental to the achievement of the industry’s long-term objectives. The judgment does 
not overrule the previous case-law but instead draws the line between what can be 
considered as a unilateral policy adopted by a non-dominant firm and what can be 
considered as an agreement. As a result, it is from now on possible for non-dominant 
pharmaceutical firms to restrict supplies to their wholesalers with the obvious aim of 
impeding parallel trade as long as they do not impose an export ban either as a part of a 
written agreement, or by penalizing the wholesalers who continue exporting. The 
Commission’s response to this new development is yet to come. However, while it is not 
expected to deviate from its well-established position against the companies that attempt 
to impede parallel trade, its vast powers in finding an agreement seems to be limited by 
the CFI and the ECJ.  
 
The Commission might be expected to develop new ways of collecting evidence to prove 
that the quotas put by the manufacturer is determined on the basis of the destination of 
the products, rather than on objective criteria. However, it may be anticipated that the 
pharmaceutical companies will be extra careful not to give any signal to their wholesalers 
that the restriction of supply is actually governed by a system of sanctions. Furthermore, 
it will be very hard for the Commission to prove this, given that it is difficult to trace the 
destination of the products. 
 
Health care is an area under the competence of the Member States. Although different 
price controls in different Member States cause distortions to competition, the 
Commission does not consider using Articles 95 and 96 EC to achieve harmonization. In 
the absence of harmonization of pricing, parallel trade will continue to exist and frustrate 
the manufacturers. In its communication on the single market in pharmaceuticals dated 
 
2 Hereinafter: “CFI”. 
3 Case T-41/96 Bayer AG v Commission [2000] ECR II-3383 (hereinafter: “Bayer”). 
4 Hereinafter: “ECJ”. 
5 Joined Cases C-2/01 and C-3/01 Bundesverband der Arzneimittel-Importeure eV and Commission v Bayer 
AG [2004] ECR I-23 (hereinafter: “Commission v Bayer”). 
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25 November 19986, the Commission already pointed out that the competition in the 
pharmaceuticals can be furthered also by trying to achieve relaxation of price controls 
rather than only continuing with the present situation of fighting against individual cases 
with the help of Article 81 EC. If the Commission would be able to rely on Article 81 EC 
to prevent companies from impeding parallel trade not as much as it used to do, it might 
choose to put more emphasis on this. The Commission has already developed another 
proposition by inviting the Member States to open the market for medicines neither 
purchased nor reimbursed by the state to full competition, in its Communication dated 1 
July 2003, namely “Call for action: A Stronger European-based Pharmaceutical Industry 
for the Benefit of the Patient”7. In this way, relaxation of government control on the 
prices may be another solution to achieving single market without referring to Article 81 
EC excessively. The analysis on the use of Article 82 EC shows that it is much more 
limited for cases concerning pharmaceutical sector than the use of Article 81 EC, because 
of the specific economic conditions of this sector.  
 
Since, the use of both Article 81 EC and Article 82 EC is limited in the Commission’s 
fight against manufacturers’ efforts to prevent parallel trade, the manufacturers will be 
able to restrict parallel trade without infringing the EC competition law. Therefore, the 
Turkish manufacturers would face the opposition of the European manufacturers in case 
the parallel trade is made available and they would like to take advantage of the parallel 
trade. Relaxation of government control on prices seems to be suggested also by the 
Commission and should be adopted by Turkish authorities in order to increase 
competitiveness of the industry without having to rely on parallel trade.  
 
2. PHARMACEUTICALS INDUSTRY IN TURKEY 
 
Pharmaceuticals industry in Turkey is one of the most important sectors in Turkey. On 
the demand side, the principal buyers of pharmaceutical products are the Social Security 
Institutions. The share of these institutions in the pharmaceutical market has been 
 
6 Commission Communication on the Single Market in Pharmaceuticals COM(98)588 final (hereinafter: 
“1998 Communication”). 
7 Commission Communication on a Stronger European-based Pharmaceutical Industry for the Benefit of 
the Patient – A Call for Action COM(2003)383 final (hereinafter: “2003 Communication”). 
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increasing consistently in the past few years. Their share increased from 35% in 1996, to 
47% in 20028. Emekli Sandığı and Bağ-Kur has reimbursement systems, whereas Sosyal 
Sigortalar Kurumu (SSK) supplies pharmaceutical products to its members through the 
pharmacies it owns. The pharmacies belonging to SSK get the pharmaceutical products 
either from its own manufacturing facilities or through mass purchases from other 
companies9.  
 
On the supply side, there are 134 companies active in this sector, of which 84 are 
manufacturers of pharmaceutical products, 12 are manufacturers of raw materials used in 
the industry and 38 are importers. Whereas there were only 10 companies with foreign 
capital in 1990, this number has increased to 36 by the year 2000. The increase in the 
number of foreign capital companies is due to the Customs Union established between 
Turkey and the EU in 1996. After the Customs Union the barriers to import 
pharmaceuticals have been removed from the market and more foreign companies chose 
to invest in Turkey. Furthermore, the foreign pharmaceutical companies, that were giving 
licenses to domestic producers, now became importers themselves or through an office in 
Turkey10.  
 
The imports of Turkey have increased considerably after the Customs Union. The 
imports have increased 173 % between 1996 and 2000. In 2003, the increase in imports 
has become as much as 125 % compared to the year before. The imports constituted 28 % 
of the pharmaceutical products market in Turkey, in 2003. This increase in imports is not 
solely the result of the Customs Union. The advanced progress in the innovative 
pharmaceutical industry and the increased use of biotechnological products, which cannot 
be manufactured in Turkey, are the other factors lying under this development. Although 
the exports still cannot cover the imports, the exports of Turkey are also increasing. This 
has been particularly evident in 2003, in which the exports have increased by 114 %. The 
 
8 Top, M. and Tarcan M., “Türkiye İlaç Ekonomisi ve İlaç Harcamaları: 1998-2003 Dönemi 
Değerlendirmesi”, 2004, p.8, available at http://www.econturk.org/Turkiyeekonomisi/ilac.doc .[accessed on 
02.06.2005] 
9 Ibid.  
10 İstanbul Sanayi Odası, “Avrupa Birliği’ne Tam Üyelik Sürecinde İstanbul Sanayi Odası Meslek 
Komiteleri Sektör Stratejileri Geliştirme Projesi: Kimya Sektörü”, December 2004, p.2. 
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industry is aiming to increase exports and considers parallel trade as a way of increasing 
exports to the EU11.  
 
The price of the pharmaceuticals is controlled by the Ministry of Health in Turkey. The 
Except in very exceptional cases, the prices of pharmaceuticals manufactured in Turkey 
are much below the similar products manufactured in the EU12. This price difference can 
be the principal motive for parallel trade. However, parallel trade is prohibited to the 
wholesalers in Turkey by the Association Council Decision No 1/95. Thus the 
representatives of the domestic industry defend that the opening of the EU 
pharmaceuticals market for parallel trade would be for their benefit.  
3. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PHARMACEUTICALS MARKET 
 
Parallel trade is the result of price differences between different Member States of the 
European Union, therefore it is important first of all to examine the factors underlying the 
determination of prices in different Member States concerning pharmaceutical products.  
 
Why is the pharmaceuticals market considered to be a special market in terms of pricing? 
In order to answer this question, main features of demand and supply in the 
pharmaceutical market should be highlighted.  
3.1 Structure of the demand: government as the principal purchaser 
 
The peculiarity of the demand for pharmaceuticals is the result of the roles different 
actors play in this market. Unlike other product markets, in pharmaceuticals market there 
are several “third parties” involved on the demand side besides the ultimate users of the 
products. These are third-party payers and prescribing physicians13. In most of the 
Member States the third party payer is the government through its public health system. 
The result is that, the government pays for the product that the patient is going to use but 
the physician prescribes to him and he can exercise no control in choosing due to lack of 
knowledge in this field. Therefore, the patient is not a “consumer” within the meaning of 
 
11 Ibid. p. 4. 
12 Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı “İlaç Sanayii Özel İhtisas Komisyonu Raporu” 2001, p.37. 
13 See Kanavos P, “Overiew of pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement regulation in Europe”, 2001, p. 
2, available at http://pharmacos.eudra.org/F3/g10/docs/synthesis.pdf [accessed on 02.06.2005]. 
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the word in other product markets14. Its contribution to the determination of the product 
is very limited. The choice of which pharmaceutical products to use is made by the 
physicians. Studies show that the physicians that prescribe the products do not take into 
account economic factors as long as they will not be paying for the costs15. Often, it is 
neither the patient that is going to pay for the costs. Since the government makes most of 
the actual purchasing or reimbursement of the costs, it may choose and almost always 
chooses to exert monopsony power on the suppliers16. Therefore they exercise control 
over prices. 
 
Another feature of the demand is that it is constantly on the rise as a result of ageing 
population, higher patient expectations, and better products as a result of technological 
advances. This means that the expenditure on health care is increasing even if the prices 
are not increasing. This expenditure is considered to grow at a faster rate than the 
economies are growing17. Thus, this creates an extra incentive for most of the Member 
States to come up with price control in this market. 
 
One other very important aspect of this market on the demand side is that there is no 
price competition. The pharmaceutical companies work hard to differentiate their 
products from the others on the basis of high quality rather than lower price18. Since the 
pharmaceutical products are complex products with several therapeutic elements, it is 
always possible to stress on the product differentiation. The pharmaceutical companies 
are relatively free to charge very high prices for their products, without the demand for 
their products being affected too much. This is because the patients cannot decide on 
which product to buy, and the physicians, who are making the decisions are free of any 
economic concerns in prescribing medicines. Furthermore, most of the time, the patients 
are concerned about only the costs not reimbursed by the government. Therefore, 
 
14 Ibid. p. 22. 
15 Jacobzone, S., “Pharmaceutical Policies in OECD Countries: Reconciling Social and Industrial Goals”, 
2000, p. 16, available at http://pharmacos.eudra.org/F3/g10/docs/OECDpharma.PDF [accessed on 
02.06.2005]. 
16 Ibid. p. 9. 
17 Supra note 13, p. 3. 
18 Hancher, L.,“The European Pharmaceutical Market: problems of partial harmonization”, 1990, 15 ELR 
9, p. 10-11. 
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governments intervene in the market to prevent companies from using this liberty to 
charge very high prices.  
 
Government intervention may take the form of direct price control or indirect control 
through reimbursement, or co-payment schemes. Although in partial reimbursement and 
co-payment schemes, the patients are also required to contribute, it is still in the 
government’s interest to keep these prices low since health policy necessitates 
maximizing patients’ benefits and it is a highly political field as well. The Member States 
have different levels of per-capita income and this has changed even more dramatically 
with the enlargement. This affects priorities of the governments as well. 
3.2 Significance of research and development for the industry 
 
On the supply side what distinguishes this market among the other product markets is the 
significance of research and development for the competitiveness of the industry. The 
only way to be competitive in this global market is to invest in innovation. However this 
proves to be very costly considering that many attempts fail in the process of developing 
a new product. The result is “a market where the ‘winners’ have to pay for the ‘losers’.”19 
The pharmaceutical companies have to reflect their costs in their prices and research and 
development costs make up for most of it. They have to finance their investment costs 
from their revenues. This has been accepted by the Commission in its Communication 
outlining an industrial policy for the pharmaceutical sector in the European Community 
dated 199420. It is stated in this report that 90% of the research and development 
spending is financed by the industry itself. Therefore, the success of the pharmaceutical 
companies depends on their ability to finance for their research and development 
activities with the revenue they get from the successful products on the market. 
 
 
19 Kon, S. and Schaeffer, F., “Parallel Imports of Pharmaceutical Products: A New Realism, or Back to 
Basics”, 1997, 3 ECL 123, p. 124. 
20 Communication on the outlines of an industrial policy for the pharmaceutical sector in the European 
Community COM(93)718 final. 
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According to a study made by Pammoli for the Commission21, the competitiveness of the 
European pharmaceutical industry is diminishing compared to its global rival, USA. This 
is in large part because the European industry invests less in research and development22. 
The Commission makes suggestions for increasing firms’ research and development 
efforts in both its 1998 Communication and 2003 Communication. To increase the 
competitiveness of the industry is to the benefit of the consumer as long as the innovation 
should result in technologically improved products. 
3.3 Dilemma of governments: cheap drugs or competitive industry? 
 
In this framework, the Member States are faced with a dilemma. Opposed to the 
previously stated goal of making pharmaceutical products at the lowest cost possible for 
the patients and thus cutting the government expenditure, there is the challenge for the 
governments to support research and development efforts of the pharmaceutical 
companies. The dilemma is between two major public policy goals; health policy and 
industrial policy. To establish the difference in policy orientations of different Member 
States is important in order to understand why pricing of pharmaceuticals varies so much 
within the European Community. 
 
According to Hancher, this dilemma is solved by Member States, depending on the 
degree of their home-based pharmaceutical industries’ development. Those Member 
States with well established, functioning and export-oriented industries (for eg. Germany 
and UK) choose to impose less control on the market. On the other hand, the Member 
States that mostly import and do not have a strong pharmaceutical industry (for eg. 
Belgium, Spain, Portugal, Greece and partially Italy) tend to impose stricter control23.  
 
According to a study made by Kanavos24, the different policy orientation of countries is 
mainly determined by the traditional involvement of the government in the economy. The 
Member States that are traditionally directly involved in other sectors of the economy 
 
21 Pammoli, F., Gamberdella, A., Orsenigo, L., “Global Competitiveness in Pharmaceuticals A European 
Perspective”, 2000, available at http://pharmacos.eudra.org/F3/g10/docs/comprep_nov2000.pdf [accessed 
on 02.06.2005]. 
22 Ibid. p. 5. 
23 Supra note 18, p. 11. 
24 Supra note 13, p. 9. 
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have extensive government interference in this market. Belgium and Spain are given as 
examples for these countries. The prices are determined after negotiating with the 
pharmaceutical companies in these countries. Kanavos also mentions ways of indirect 
control in its study and gives UK as an example for exercising price control indirectly, 
through controlling the rate of return on capital invested. The last way of imposing price 
control is given as reference pricing exercised by the third group of Member States 
including Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal and partly Italy. Although this 
method of price control can be considered as supportive of convergence of prices, 
nevertheless, the prices continue to vary. Which countries are chosen for taking reference 
determines the maximum prices in these countries. While some of them take as reference 
the average of prices in the neighboring countries, some (like Greece and Portugal) take 
the lowest price countries as a reference. 
 
Price regulation of medicines is approved by the ECJ in Roussel25. In this case, the ECJ 
maintained that price-setting in the pharmaceutical market does not violate any 
provisions of the Community law as long as this does not give rise to discrimination 
against the imported products. As a result, the pharmaceuticals market is regulated in all 
Member States albeit with different considerations and priorities causing the prices to 
vary very much in the Community. This situation is unlikely to change in the future since 
in the 1998 Communication even the Commission agrees to the fact that achieving 
harmonization in pricing will be unlikely26.  
4. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EC COMPETITION LAW: PARALLEL 
TRADE OF PHARMACEUTICALS AFTER THE BAYER JUDGMENT 
4.1 Commission’s position against prevention of parallel trade 
 
In the 1998 Communication, parallel trade is defined as “an important driving force for 
market integration and, consequently, for achieving the Single Market”27. In the words of 
Commissioner Monti, “[F]rom the early sixties the Commission has pursued a merciless 
policy against companies which – one way or the other - clipped the wings of parallel 
 
25 Case 181/82, Roussel Laboratoria v. Netherlands, [1983] ECR 3849, at paras 18-19.  
26 1998 Communication, p. 11. 
27 1998 Communication, p. 4. 
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traders”28. The Commission took decisions to prevent also pharmaceutical companies 
from impeding parallel trade. However, it has been criticized by the pharmaceutical 
companies for not taking into consideration the peculiar characteristics of the industry, 
which in their view, cause benefits of parallel trade pronounced for other sectors not to 
apply in this sector. The latest decision of the Commission applying Article 81 EC to the 
pharmaceutical sector, Glaxo29, illustrates the arguments of both of the parties to the 
discussion well, and is also significant because the industry brought before the 
Commission for the first time the arguments for justifying restrictions to parallel trade 
with economic and consumer welfare arguments30.  
 
Glaxo decision was taken after Glaxo Wellcome has notified to the Commission its new 
sales conditions for its Spanish wholesalers. The new conditions concerned having 
different prices for products that are going to be exported and the products that are going 
to stay in the Spanish market. Glaxo Wellcome was asking for negative clearance or an 
exemption for this dual-pricing system. However, the Commission agreed to give neither 
negative clearance nor an exemption, adhering to the idea that likewise other types of 
conditions with the object of restricting parallel trade, dual-pricing systems and export 
bans constitute “restrictions by object” and are forbidden without even the need to prove 
their anticompetitive effects.31
4.1.1 Application of competition rules to an already regulated area 
 
There is an idea among the pharmaceutical industry and those who advocate prevention 
of parallel trade that it is not possible to apply regular rules of competition to a field that 
 
28 Speech by Commissioner Mario Monti European Commissioner for Competition Policy Competition and 
Consumer: the case of Pharmaceutical Products European Competition Day in Antwerpen, 11.10.2001, 
available at 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/01/450&format=HTML&aged=0&l
anguage=EN&guiLanguage=en [accessed on 02.06.2005]. 
29 2001/791/EC, Commission Decision of 8 May 2001 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of the 
EC Treaty Cases: IV/36.957/F3 Glaxo Wellcome (notification), IV/36.997/F3 Aseprofar and Fedifar 
(complaint), IV/37.121/F3 Spain Pharma (complaint), IV/37.138/F3 BAI (complaint), IV/37.380/F3 
EAEPC (complaint) (notified under document number C (2001) 1202), OJ L 302/1, 17.11.2001 (hereinafter 
“Glaxo”). 
30 Kliemann, A., “Commission Decisison prohibits Glaxo Wellcome’s Spanish pricing system”, 2001, 
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/publications/cpn/cpn2001_2.pdf [accessed on 
02.06.2005]. 
31 Glaxo, at recital 125. 
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is so much regulated. Parallel trade will contribute to the convergence of prices and 
therefore market integration only if the market is open to perfect competition. In the 
present situation of intense market regulation where the prices are not determined by 
market conditions, it will not be possible for the manufacturer to adjust its prices in the 
low-price country, and the result will be forcing towards harmonization at the cheapest 
price32.  
 
In line with this thought, an argument that the dual-pricing system should be established 
for compensating a distortion of competition caused by Spain was raised also by Glaxo 
Wellcome in asking for negative clearance. Glaxo Wellcome argued that since the prices 
are already fixed for the Spanish market, to open the way to charge different prices for 
exports from this market will only mean opening the market to competition33. However, 
the Commission rejected this argument34. First, the Commission reminded that in Merck 
v Primecrown35 the ECJ has established that distortions of competition that are caused by 
a Member State should not be a reason to justify derogation from the principle of free 
movement of goods36. In this respect, the Commission states that existence of price 
controls in Member States does not mean that they can give undertakings the right to 
prevent importation of goods that are lawfully marketed in another Member State. 
Therefore, if Member States’ legislation cannot give this right to derogate from free 
movement of goods, an agreement which meets the conditions of Article 81(1) EC should 
not be permitted to impose restrictions on free movement of goods.37 This is based on the 
fact that both Article 28 EC and Article 81 EC aim to achieve market integration. This 
illustrates clearly the Commission’s attitude towards the interaction of principles of free 
movement of goods and competition rules in the struggle against parallel trade. An 
undertaking, once become a party to an agreement within the meaning of Article 81(1) 
EC, is subject to the same rules of free movement of goods as the Member States are.   
 
 
32 Supra note 19; Vicién, C. F., “Why Parallel Imports of Pharmaceutical Products Should be Forbidden”, 
1996, 4 ECLR 219; Rey, P. and Venit, J., “Parallel trade and pharmaceuticals: a policy in search of itself”, 
2004, 29(2) ELR 153. 
33 Glaxo, at recitals 79-82. 
34 Glaxo, at recital 127. 
35 Joined Cases C-267/95 and C-268/95, Merck& Co.Inc. v Primecrown Limited [1996] ECR I-6285 
(hereinafter: “Merck v Primecrown”). 
36 ibid., at para 47. 
37 Glaxo, at recital 129. 
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Secondly, the Commission drew a comparison with the other sectors and does not agree 
with Glaxo Wellcome in finding that pharmaceutical industry is peculiar in terms of 
government involvement. In the Commission’s view, in other sectors such as the car 
sector, there is also government involvement (through tax levels) and although this 
creates differences in prices as well, it has never been accepted by the Commission as a 
reason for justifying restrictions on parallel trade. Furthermore the Commission even 
indicates an advantage pharmaceutical industry has over other sectors and this is their 
involvement in deciding on the price together with the government at the negotiation 
stage.38
 
Therefore it can be concluded that the Commission does not support the view that 
distortions to competition should be corrected by undertakings. 
4.1.2 The effect of parallel trade on companies’ R&D efforts 
 
A very common argument put forward by the pharmaceutical manufacturers and the 
advocates of prevention of parallel trade is that since companies depend almost entirely 
on their revenues for their R&D expenditure, the loss of revenue through parallel trade 
impedes their research and development efforts. In their article, Kon and Schaeffer give 
reference to a report prepared for DG IV by REMIT consultants39 where parallel traders 
are described as entrepreneurs who do not have any R&D programmes or concern for 
industry’s long-term future. In the authors’ view, it is impossible for the pharmaceutical 
industry to go on with its R&D investments if the parallel trade continues40. Rey and 
Venit support this argument and furthermore state that parallel imports have three 
negative effects on R&D41. Not only do they reduce the funds available for current 
projects and cause companies’ incentives to invest in R&D to decrease, but also, they 
interfere with the policies of those governments that support innovation efforts against 
restraining government spending on health care. When the products are imported from 
 
38 Glaxo, at recital 132 
39 REMIT Consultants, “Impediments to Parallel Trade in Pharmaceuticals within the European 
Community”, 1992. 
40 Supra note 19, p. 124-125. 
41 Rey, P. and Venit, J., “Parallel trade and pharmaceuticals: a policy in search of itself”, 2004, 29(2) ELR 
153, p. 167. 
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low price countries to high price countries, the policy of supporting the industry is 
affected in the high price country.  
 
Glaxo Wellcome attempted to use this argument to justify its dual-pricing system under 
an exemption provided by Article 81(3) EC. It claimed that parallel trade causes the 
firm’s R&D efforts to decrease. This in turn results in less technical progress and 
diminished consumer benefit. However, this argument was rejected by the Commission, 
which stated that the causal link between a decrease in R&D expenditure and impact of 
parallel trade has not been established by Glaxo Wellcome. In the Commission’s view, 
while it is true that parallel trade may decrease the revenues of a manufacturing company, 
this does not necessarily mean that the decrease in revenues will directly result in a 
decrease in R&D spending.42 As the proof of its argument, the Commission stated that in 
the last 20 years in which parallel trade has been a reality, the R&D expenditure has 
continued to grow enormously43. 
4.1.3 Who benefits from parallel trade? 
 
Opponents of parallel trade in pharmaceuticals often site the Commission stating “Unless 
parallel trade can operate dynamically on prices, it creates inefficiencies because most, 
but not all, of the financial benefit accrues to the parallel trader rather than to the health 
care system or patient.”44 Although the Commission goes on stating why parallel trade 
“must equally be seen” as promoting market integration45, those who are against parallel 
trade argue that in pharmaceuticals it does not result in increasing consumer welfare as it 
does in other sectors where the prices are not regulated and furthermore, it doesn’t cause 
a remarkable decrease in government spending.  
 
When this argument was raised by Glaxo Wellcome, the Commission rejected it right 
away and stated that patients have direct benefits from parallel trade when partial 
reimbursement and co-payment exist in the health-care system.46 Furthermore, the 
 
42 Glaxo, at recital 155. 
43 Glaxo, at recital 158. 
44 1998 Communication, p. 4. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Glaxo, at recital 184. 
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Commission extended the notion of consumer in terms of consumers in the 
pharmaceuticals sector and stated that parallel trade benefits wholesalers, pharmacies, 
national health budgets, and insurance schemes by contributing to cost-savings. 
According to the Commission, the countries that the parallel traders choose as destination 
even give incentives to parallel trade to achieve more cost-savings.47  
 
4.2 Use of Article 81 EC in Preventing Parallel Trade 
 
In order to be able to fight against impediments to parallel trade caused by undertakings, 
the Commission needs to take decisions addressing undertakings. To guarantee the 
achievement of the single market in which the competition rules are respected it has to 
ensure that the undertakings are abiding by the rules. By the EC Treaty, the Commission 
is empowered to take decisions addressing undertakings using only either Article 81 EC 
or Article 82 EC. Until now the Commission has not taken any decisions applying Article 
82 EC to the pharmaceutical sector. On the Commission’s initiative, Article 81 EC was 
used against companies in two decisions.  
 
The two decisions applying Article 81 EC to the pharmaceutical sector were Sandoz 
decision48 in 1987 and Bayer decision in 1996. In both of these decisions, the companies 
were fined for entering into an agreement with their wholesalers about fixing an export 
ban. Both of the pharmaceutical companies challenged these decisions. The 
Commission’s decision in Sandoz was upheld by the ECJ49 while its decision was 
annulled in Bayer by the CFI and this judgment was upheld by the ECJ50. 
 
Sandoz concerned the parallel trade of the products of Sandoz from Italy to other Member 
States. The Italian subsidiary of Sandoz was fined for trying to impede this parallel trade 
through imposing an export ban. There was no explicit agreement between Sandoz and its 
customers. However, the fact that the invoices sent by Sandoz contained the words 
 
47 Glaxo, at recitals 185 and 186. 
48 87/409/EEC, Commission Decision of 13 July 1987 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC 
Treaty (IV/31.741 - Sandoz), OJ L 222/28, 10.08.1987. 
49 Case C-277/87 Sandoz prodotto farmaceutici SpA v Commission [1990] ECR I-45 (hereinafter: 
“Sandoz”). 
50 Supra note 5. 
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“export prohibited” was enough to show that “continuous commercial relationship” was 
set up between Sandoz and its customers51. The Commission states that “[T]he fact that 
the invoices have been constantly and systematically used leads to the conclusion that 
Sandoz PF's clients implicitly agreed with it and accepted it.”52 The Commission was not 
able to establish the existence of a restriction of supply policy aimed at preventing 
parallel trade53. However, the words on the invoices were accepted as sales conditions. 
Although Sandoz argued that this invoice was sent to the customer only after the deal has 
been made, and that the so called export ban was not a precondition of the purchasing, 
this argument was rejected by the Commission who stated that the systematic use of this 
condition made it a part of a continuous business relationship. The Commission found 
that even the tacit acquiescence of the distributors meant that an agreement existed. The 
ECJ has upheld the decision and agreed with the Commission in finding an agreement.  
 
In the view of Jakobsen and Broberg54 this was a very far-reaching judgment. The 
Commission and the ECJ have disregarded the fact that the clause was contrary to the 
interests of the distributors and in fact several of them have actually re-exported the 
product nevertheless. It is true that there was no evidence to show that the customers who 
would actually export the products were going to be penalized. It is worth emphasizing at 
this point that, later on, in Bayer, the CFI looked for a system of sanctions in order to 
prove that the interests of the wholesalers in continuing with the conditions of Bayer lied 
in fear of sanctions.  
 
The main issue of Bayer concerned the restriction of supply exercised by the Spanish and 
French subsidiaries of Bayer on their wholesalers. The wholesalers were supplied with 
products as much as it was consumed in their geographical area. The Commission stated 
that Bayer infringed Article 81(1) EC by imposing an export ban as part of its 
commercial relations with its wholesalers55. There was no explicit agreement between 
Bayer and its wholesalers. The Commission based its finding about the existence of an 
 
51 Supra note 48, at para 25. 
52 Supra note 48, at para 26. 
53 Supra note 48, at para 30. 
54 Jakobsen, P.S., and Broberg, M., “The Concept of Agreement in Article 81 EC: On the Manufacturers’ 
Right to Prevent Parallel Trade Within the European Community”, 2002, 3 ECLR 127. 
55 Bayer decision, at recitals 155-159. 
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agreement on two points. First, there was an export ban imposed by Bayer and second, 
the wholesalers showed tacit acquiescence to Bayer’s policy of restricting supply and 
imposing an export ban. Bayer appealed the decision before the CFI. 
 
What Bayer has accepted in the case before the CFI was that it had restricted supply to its 
wholesalers with the aim of restricting parallel trade56. What it did not accept was that it 
exercised this policy in agreement with its wholesalers and that it imposed an export ban. 
Bayer claimed that it was placing quotas on the quantities ordered unilaterally. These 
quotas were determined on the basis of the wholesalers’ orders in the previous year, 
allowing an increase of about 10% per year in accordance with the increase in 
consumption57. Furthermore, it has emphasized that its sales personnel was strictly 
instructed to give to the wholesalers “stock shortages” as the reason for these quotas. 
Bayer made it clear that when the wholesalers became aware of the true reason behind 
this restriction; they pretended to comply with the new situation while at the same time 
they continued to look for alternative ways to circumvent the quota and in fact the 
parallel exports continued58. Furthermore, in case the wholesalers chose to export the 
products allocated to them instead of supplying to the internal market, Bayer has assured 
that it was going to supply itself to those areas of the internal market where there was 
shortage of its products59. Therefore, the wholesalers were left free even to stop their 
activities in their geographical areas in favour of exporting the goods in their quota. 
 
The Commission found existence of an export ban in its decision by identifying first the 
existence of a monitoring system for detecting exporting wholesalers and second by 
showing that these exporting wholesalers were facing reductions in the amounts supplied 
to them by Bayer. Therefore, according to the Commission, the wholesalers were 
threatened to have a decrease in their supplies if they would continue exporting60. 
However, the CFI found that the Commission has not proved that there was systematic 
 
56 Bayer, at para 34. 
57 Bayer, at para 35. 
58 Bayer, at para 30. 
59 Bayer, at para 141. 
60 Bayer decision, at recitals 160-170. 
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monitoring of the final destination of the products or that there were sanctions or threats 
applied by Bayer against the wholesalers61.  
 
Not having accepted the Commission’s argument that an export ban had existed, the CFI 
went on to show why the behaviour of the wholesalers cannot be regarded as implicit 
acquiescence.  In this regard, unlike the ECJ in Sandoz, the CFI did not find that this 
restriction formed part of continuous commercial relations between Bayer and its 
wholesalers. The Commission’s argument that the wholesalers even adjusted their 
conduct according to this ban was rejected by the CFI. The CFI maintained that far from 
being a proof of an agreement, the wholesalers’ efforts to circumvent these quotas can 
only mean that there was no tacit acquiescence62. The CFI stated that when the de facto 
conduct of the wholesalers are contrary to the policy adopted by the manufacturer, the 
mere fact that the commercial relations continue does not mean that there is an 
agreement.63 Therefore the CFI concluded that there was neither an agreement between 
the parties nor an export ban enforced by Bayer.  
 
The Court of First Instance has decided that Commission was wrong in finding an 
agreement and annulled the Commission’s decision. In its judgment, the primary focus of 
the Court was that the Commission has not supplied enough evidence in order to prove 
the existence of an agreement. Not surprisingly, the Commission has concentrated in 
showing the existence of an agreement in its appeal. The ECJ held that the CFI was right 
in examining whether compliance of its policy was required by Bayer as a condition for 
continuing the relations with its wholesalers64.  It further established that the CFI was 
correct in making a distinction between the declared intention and the genuine wishes of 
the wholesalers. According to the ECJ as well, the actual attitude of the wholesalers was 
more important in finding whether they showed tacit acquiescence65.The ECJ makes it 
clear that “the mere fact that a measure adopted by a manufacturer, which has the object 
or effect of restricting competition, falls within the context of continuous business 
relations between the manufacturer and its wholesaler is not sufficient for a finding that 
 
61 Bayer, at para 109. 
62 Bayer, at para 155. 
63 Bayer, at para 173. 
64 Commission v Bayer, at para 103. 
65 Commission v Bayer, at para 124. 
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such an agreement exists.”66 Therefore, the European Court of Justice upheld the 
judgment of the Court of First Instance. 
 
4.2.1 Concept of “agreement” in case-law 
 
In Bayer and its appeal, the CFI and the ECJ put down the line between what constitutes 
a unilateral policy and what can be assumed as an agreement within the meaning of 
Article 81 EC. This is important because the rules applying to undertakings in the EC 
Treaty require for either a dominant position of a single undertaking or an agreement 
between at least two undertakings. A unilateral policy adopted by a non-dominant firm 
cannot be subject to these rules even if the aim of this policy is explicitly restriction of 
competition. This is why the Commission is inclined to interpret the concept of 
agreement in a broad way and has regarded some seemingly unilateral practices as in fact 
constituting an agreement. Until Bayer judgment, this approach was upheld by the 
European Court of Justice. Examples of such agreements concerned export bans67 and 
resale bans68 as well as refusals to supply. When these decisions were appealed before 
the Court of Justice, the decisions were challenged by the companies who claimed that 
they were engaged in unilateral actions and not agreements. The Commission referred to 
examples of these judgments regarding refusal to supply in asking the CFI to uphold its 
Bayer decision. It is worth mentioning the CFI’s answer to this, since it shows how the 
present case should be distinguished from the established case-law. 
 
The earliest case mentioned by the Commission is BMW Belgium v Commission.69 This 
case is differentiated from Bayer by the fact that BMW Belgium made its intentions to 
prohibit exports of new BMW products from Belgium through the circulars it has sent to 
the BMW dealers. The existence of such circulars was evaluated within the framework of 
the pre-existing agreement with its dealers and it’s concluded that an agreement existed. 
There were no such circulars in Bayer. 
 
66 Commission v Bayer, at para 141. 
67 See for eg 88/172/EEC, Commission Decision of 18 December 1987 relating to a proceeding under 
Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/31.503 - Konica), OJ L 78/34, 23.03.1988. 
68 See for eg 90/38/EEC, Commission Decision of 13 December 1989 relating to a proceeding under 
Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/32.026 - Bayo-n-ox), OJ L 21/71, 26.01.1990. 
69 Cases 32/78 etc BMW Belgium SA v Commission [1979] ECR 2435. 
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Two cases mentioned by the Commission in Bayer considered selective distribution 
systems. The main distinction between them and Bayer was seen in this fact. In AEG70 
and Ford71 there were selective distribution systems. The Commission has found an 
agreement in both of them because the distributors were not admitted to the system if 
they did not accept, tacit or expressly, the policy of the supplier72. In AEG, AEG wanted 
to preserve high prices and exclude modern channels of distribution and had developed a 
policy accordingly. The distributors who accepted this policy were supplying products 
with high prices whereas the retail-outlets who were not accepting to have high prices 
were not accepted to the system. In Ford, the issue was Ford’s refusal to supply right-
hand drive cars to its distributors in Germany in order to avoid their exportation to UK.  
 
What differentiated Ford from AEG is that the distributors had no advantage in 
complying with this policy. Although they were found to be part of an agreement because 
they accepted the condition, this was not an agreement in the usual sense in which both 
parties benefit. In Jakobsen and Broberg’s view, the fact that Ford refused to supply 
should be considered as a breach of the agreement and thus a unilateral act of Ford.73 
However, the ECJ decided that refusal to supply was a part of the main distributor 
agreement. In fact this situation is almost always the case in agreements concerning 
prevention of parallel trade. Whereas the manufacturers have an interest in limiting 
parallel trade, their wholesalers or distributors in the exporting country would prefer to go 
on since it is increasing their sales. Then the question must be; if the distributor or 
wholesaler does not have an interest in applying the manufacturer’s policy, then why 
should it agree to comply? The answer is given by Jakobsen and Broberg as the 
motivation by the fear of sanctions imposed by the manufacturer74. Therefore, it is 
essential to prove that there is control and a system of sanctions imposed by the 
manufacturer, in order to conclude that the wholesaler entered into an agreement with the 
manufacturer.  
 
70 Case 107/82 AEG-Telefunken v Commission [1983] ECR 3151 (hereinafter: “AEG”). 
71 Joined Cases 25 and 26/84 Ford - Werke AG and Ford of Europe Inc. v Commission [1985] ECR 2725 
(hereinafter: “Ford”). 
72 AEG, at para 38; Ford, at para 21. 
73 Supra note 54, p.130. 
74 Supra note 54, p. 134. 
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Tipp-Ex75 was another case referred by the Commission which was distinguished from 
Bayer because of the sanctions involved. This case concerned an exclusive distribution 
agreement. The refusal to supply was demanded by the manufacturer from the wholesaler 
to be applied to those customers that re-sell the products to other Member States. 
Whereas the Commission made a parallel between this case and Bayer, the CFI has 
decided that the subsequent checks carried out by the manufacturer made a crucial 
difference in finding an agreement in this case. The distributor had to increase its prices 
only to its customer that was exporting the products, because the manufacturer adopted a 
penalty in case the distributor chose not to comply with its request. After establishing 
this, the CFI concluded that the refusal to supply was the result of an agreement. 
 
Perhaps the case that resembled Bayer the most was Sandoz. They both concerned 
practices adopted by big pharmaceutical companies in order to prevent parallel imports of 
their medicinal products. In both cases the manufacturers chose to restrict supplies to 
their wholesalers. In both Bayer and Sandoz, there were no explicit agreements between 
the manufacturers and wholesalers regarding this refusal of supply and the Commission 
relied on the existence of an export ban inserted into a series of continuous commercial 
relations between the manufacturer and the wholesalers in order to find the existence of 
an agreement. However, according to the CFI, there were two crucial differences between 
the two cases and they corresponded exactly to what the Commission set out to prove in 
its decision. First difference was in proving the existence of an export ban, and the 
second one was in proving the tacit acquiescence of the wholesalers.  
 
According to the CFI, in Sandoz, what made the crucial difference was the fact that the 
words “export prohibited” were printed on the invoices sent to the customers. As a result, 
the existence of an export ban was proved together with the tacit acquiescence of the 
wholesalers. The absence of such a manifestation in Bayer, either verbally or written, 
made it even more important for the Commission to prove the existence of an export ban 
through a system of monitoring and sanctions. However, as discussed before, its findings 
 
75 Case C-279/87 Tipp-Ex GmbH v Commission [1990] ECR 1-261 (hereinafter Tipp-Ex). 
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in this respect were not enough for the ECJ to prove that Bayer conducted a system of 
control to ensure that its wholesalers abided by its policy of preventing exports.  
 
In Sandoz, since the invoices were sent to wholesalers in each purchase regularly, it was 
found to be part of a continuous commercial relation. However, in Bayer there was no 
such relation.  The Commission is criticized for maintaining that when parties maintain 
their commercial relations, the existence of an agreement is proven. According to the 
CFI, it is important to distinguish the de facto behaviour of the wholesalers after a new 
policy is adopted unilaterally by the manufacturer. If the wholesalers act contrary to the 
new policy even though on the appearance they seem to agree, this may not account for 
concurrence of wills76. 
4.2.2 Reflections on the Bayer judgment 
 
The judgment was welcomed by the pharmaceutical industry77. The industry was 
advocating for a long time the negative effects of parallel trade and disagreeing with the 
Commission’s policy of furthering parallel trade. In a media briefing of the Association 
of British Pharmaceutical Industry, parallel trade is accused of costing 6 pounds for every 
pound the government health system saves and consequently complain that in the long 
term this may cause the British pharmaceutical industry to contribute less to trade balance 
and employment78. President of the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries 
and Associations (EFPIA) states that parallel trade is undermining European 
pharmaceutical competitiveness and claims that it benefits neither the patients nor the 
social security systems. Furthermore, according to him, parallel trade causes not only the 
European pharmaceutical companies’ ability to invest in R&D to decrease but also 
discourages global companies to invest in Europe79. 
 
 
76 Bayer, at para 173. 
77 Press release of The European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA) on 6 
January 2004, available at http://www.efpia.org/3_press/20040106.htm [accessed on 02.06.2005]. 
78 Association of British Pharmaceutical Industry, “Parallel Trade in Medicines”, available at 
http://www.abpi.org.uk/press/media_briefings/pdfs/2001/PARALL_TRADE.PDF [accessed on 
02.06.2005]. 
79 Press release of The European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA) on 10 
February 2004, available at http://www.efpia.org/3_press/20040210.htm [accessed on 02.06.2005]. 
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However, the industry was unable to prevent parallel trade because it was legal in Europe 
based on the principle of free movement of goods and the exhaustion principle of 
intellectual property rights. As explained above, the Commission regards parallel trade as 
an important element for market integration and is determined to fight with undertakings 
which try to impede parallel trade of their products. In this setting, the CFI’s annulment 
of the Commission’s Bayer decision is very important in three aspects. First, it 
established that pharmaceutical companies may take unilateral actions to prevent parallel 
trade as long as they do not have a dominant position and that parallel trade must not be 
protected in all cases. Second, by limiting the concept of agreement it showed a way 
which the pharmaceutical industry may use to restrict parallel trade of medicines without 
infringing competition rules. Third, it rejected the Commission’s argument that parallel 
trade will bring about in the long term the harmonization of prices in the pharmaceuticals 
market. 
 
First of all, the answer the CFI gives to the Commission’s claim that parallel trade must 
be protected in all circumstances is worth mentioning. This argument was raised by the 
Commission based on the ECJ’s judgment in Merck v Primecrown.  As mentioned above, 
this case established that distortions of competition that are caused by Member States 
should not be a reason to justify a Member State’s attempts to prevent parallel trade. 
However, in Bayer, the CFI rejects the Commission’s attempt to widen the meaning of 
this statement and maintains that it does not mean that there is a general prohibition on 
preventing parallel exports applying also to undertakings80. In this respect, the CFI is 
firm in distinguishing between the rules applying to undertakings and rules applying to 
Member States. In Merck v Primecrown the issue concerned law on the free movement of 
goods which applies to Member States. However in Bayer, the issue concerns Article 81 
EC, which applies to undertakings. Whereas Article 81 EC is also aiming at achievement 
of a single market, it is clear from its wording that in order to apply this article, first there 
must be an agreement. Therefore, it is limited to agreements and does not apply to all 
restrictions of competition capable of affecting trade within the Community. Thus, in 
Glaxo, the Commission reformulated its perception of the principle put down by the ECJ 
in Merck v Primecrown and maintained that a parallel between principles on free 
 
80 Bayer, at para 178. 
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movement of goods and competition rules can be drawn based on Merck v Primecrown 
when and only if there is an agreement within the meaning of Article 81 EC81, which was 
certainly the case in Glaxo.  
 
Therefore the CFI in Bayer has established that solely unilateral practices of undertakings 
are outside the application of competition rules. Furthermore, the CFI made a very 
important statement that the manufacturer’s right to take measures, when he is faced with 
a situation which is damaging its interests, is limited only as far as Articles 81 and 82 EC 
apply82. In the CFI’s own words, “provided that does so without abusing its dominant 
position and there is no concurrence of wills between him and his wholesalers, a 
manufacturer may adopt the supply policy which he considers necessary, even if, by the 
very nature of its aim, for example to hinder parallel imports, the implementation of that 
policy may entail restrictions on competition and affect trade between Member States.”83  
 
The CFI accused the Commission of attempting “enlarging or straining the scope of the 
Section 1 (Rules applying to undertakings) of Chapter 1 of Title VI of the Treaty”84. 
According to the CFI, it’s not open to the Commission to remedy distortions to 
competition by different price legislations in different Member States by using Article 81 
EC or Article 82 EC. It is maintained that differences in price controls in a Member State 
must be resolved by Community authorities.85  Furthermore the Commission is criticized 
for extending the scope of Article 81(1) EC so much that refusal to sell would be 
penalized in situations where a non-dominant firm merely exercises a unilateral policy, 
whereas under Article 82 EC, a dominant firm would be penalized for refusal to supply 
only if this constitutes an abuse. The CFI reminds in this regard the case-law which 
establishes that even an undertaking with a dominant position may adopt a policy 
entailing restriction of supply.86  
 
 
81 Glaxo, at recital 129. 
82 Bayer, at para 176. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Bayer, at para 179. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Bayer, at para 180. 
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After Bayer, it became clear for the pharmaceutical industry, that in principle, they have 
the right to prevent parallel imports. How important it may be for the integration of the 
single market, it is still not possible to prohibit unilateral actions of undertakings based 
on the competition rules of the EC Treaty and the rules on free movement of goods apply 
only to the Member States. According to Rey and Venit, with this judgment, the CFI, 
followed by the ECJ, has for the first time questioned the suitability of achieving single 
market using competition rules87.  They evaluate the CFI’s answer as recognizing that a 
policy of encouraging parallel trade should be avoided since it will distort competition in 
pharmaceuticals. However, it would be too far to think that the CFI actually recognized 
parallel trade as causing distortion to competition. Whereas it is true that it has 
acknowledged the manufacturer’s right to prevent parallel trade, it has reasoned this 
conclusion by the existence of a manufacturer’s right to act to protect its own interests as 
long as he complied with Articles 81 and 82 EC88.  The CFI maintains that according to 
the established case-law of the ECJ, free enterprise is safeguarded when applying the 
competition rules of the Treaty.89
 
The second important aspect of Bayer is that it limited to concept of agreement to open a 
way to the pharmaceutical companies to prevent parallel trade. If the non-dominant 
undertakings would like to prevent parallel trading of their products, they might do so by 
restricting the supplies to their wholesalers. As a result the manufacturers may restrict 
supply even with the obvious aim of preventing its exports but this prevention may not 
become in the form of any kind of an export ban imposed on the wholesalers. Therefore, 
in operating this policy, manufacturers need to be cautious in not giving information 
about this policy, either written or verbal, to their wholesalers and ensuring that they do 
not operate any form of control on the final destination of their products and sanction the 
wholesalers who actually export the products. Case-law, as it is once again maintained in 
Bayer, establishes that in order for concurrence of wills to be established it is enough to 
have either a written notice sent by the manufacturer to the wholesaler90, or a system of 
 
87 Supra note 41, p. 174. 
88 Bayer, at para 176. 
89 Bayer, at para 180. 
90 See for eg Sandoz. 
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penalties to those wholesalers who export the products supplied91. According to Whish, 
the judgment is extremely important because if the Court had not annulled the 
Commission’s decision, it would mean that consensus between the parties is no longer a 
requirement to find an infringement of Article 81(1) EC. This would give the 
Commission an enormous power to be able to prevent parallel trade92. After  Bayer, it is 
definitely emphasized that if there is no consensus between the parties either because of 
common interests, fear of sanctions or even simply tacit acquiescence, an agreement 
cannot be found to exist. 
 
Lastly, it is significant that the CFI rejected the Commission’s argument that parallel 
imports will in the long term bring about harmonization of the prices of 
pharmaceuticals93. CFI did not elaborate on this statement and contented with stating that 
it is “devoid of all foundation”94. There are some arguments for explaining why the CFI 
adopted such a stance, which will be discussed below. However, what is so important 
about this is that the CFI refused the Commission’s policy of achieving harmonization of 
prices through parallel trade instead of through Community measures. Harmonization of 
prices in health care is a very sensitive issue and requires Member States’ consent if any 
step is to be taken. Although it is crucial to attain a single market which is going to 
increase the competitiveness of the pharmaceutical industry95, it seems unlikely that the 
Member States are going to agree on it in the near future. Commission wanted to 
overcome this difficulty by using parallel trade instead, but this was rejected by the 
Court. 
4.2.3 Possible factors underlying the Court’s change of approach 
 
In Rey and Venit’s view, the CFI’s approach in Bayer amounted to “an important 
constitutional objection to the Commission’s use of its power under the competition rules 
to attempt to create a single market.”96 The CFI did not use the economical reasoning to 
come to this conclusion but according to Rey and Venit, it entailed an implicit 
 
91 See for eg Tipp-Ex. 
92 Whish R, “Competition Law”, 2003, LexisNexis Butterworths, UK, p. 106. 
93 Bayer, at para 181. 
94 Ibid. 
95 1998 Communication.  
96 Supra note 41, p. 174. 
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recognition by the Court of how parallel trade of pharmaceuticals can disturb the 
projected outcome of governments’ policy choices. When the CFI rejected the 
Commission’s argument that parallel trade will bring about harmonization in pricing of 
pharmaceuticals, Rey and Venit argues that, it implicitly based this on the consideration 
that this way of harmonization will in the long term have damaging effects on social 
welfare. Rey and Venit point out that contrary to what the CFI stated, the idea of 
achieving price harmonization through parallel trade has foundation in economic theory. 
However, economic theory also emphasizes the negative consequences this kind of 
harmonization will have on social welfare, such as transfer of revenues from R&D based 
manufacturers to traders, harm caused to policies of those governments that aimed to 
encourage R&D investment and development of less number of innovative medicines97.  
According to them, the CFI opted for avoiding harmonization through parallel trade in 
order to prevent these negative consequences. 
 
It is true that in its evaluation, the CFI has not explicitly touched upon the economic 
arguments which have long been advocated by the pharmaceutical industry. It has 
avoided differentiating this sector from the other sectors in which parallel trade is 
frequently seen. It is very much arguable if the CFI really took peculiar characteristics of 
the pharmaceutical sector into account in giving this judgment. However, it is also true 
that Bayer’s principal argument was not this in asking for an annulment. Bayer based its 
arguments on the fact that an agreement did not exist between it and its wholesalers. The 
CFI was able to avoid answering this by finding a ground for annulment in Bayer’s first 
plea.  
 
Since the CFI does not get into economic grounds and the peculiar characteristics of the 
pharmaceutical industry in order to explain why it is not possible to attain harmonization 
of prices through parallel trade, it sets a general rule for avoiding the Commission to use 
competition rules to prevent parallel trade in all sectors. This will have effects not only in 
the pharmaceuticals sector but also in other sectors in which parallel trade is seen. After 
this judgment, it is expected that the companies in other sectors as well would be 
defending themselves by stating that they were implementing a unilateral policy when 
 
97 Supra note 41, p. 175. 
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they receive a Commission decision accusing them of engaging in an agreement with 
their wholesalers or distributors for preventing parallel trade. The CFI and the ECJ must 
be well aware that this judgment will be interpreted as a way out for preventing parallel 
trade for manufacturers in all sectors. Therefore, it can be concluded that the Court really 
intended to show where the Commission’s powers end in fighting against parallel trade 
rather than to disguise a special decision for the pharmaceuticals sector under the 
seemingly constitutional argument. 
 
Furthermore, it can be assumed that the CFI deliberately chose not to reason its decision 
with an economic one based on pharmaceuticals industry particularly, because this could 
have far-reaching consequences for the pharmaceutical industry. It is important that the 
CFI did not oppose the Commission’s efforts to preserve parallel trade in pharmaceuticals 
in principle. However, it asked the Commission to do so within the limits of its powers 
given by the EC Treaty. If the CFI would have accepted the pharmaceutical industry’s 
arguments that parallel trade is harmful for this industry particularly, it could have the 
consequence of legalizing the efforts of those pharmaceutical companies who wish to 
have the right to prevent parallel trade in any way – even a way that is infringing Article 
81(1) EC or Article 82 EC. Instead, the CFI still left it open for the Commission to find 
infringements of Article 81(1) EC when pharmaceutical manufacturers impose an export 
ban on their wholesalers and their wholesalers do not oppose it, or to find infringement of 
Article 82 EC when a dominant pharmaceutical company attempts to prevent parallel 
trading of its products by abusing its dominant position. 
4.3 How might the Commission change its policy after Bayer? 
 
After Bayer, the Commission gave another decision applying Article 81 EC to the 
pharmaceutical industry in Glaxo. Because Glaxo Wellcome asked for an exemption 
under Article 81(3) EC, the Commission had to evaluate the peculiar characteristics of 
the pharmaceuticals industry in order to decide if they justify an exemption. The response 
of the Commission to this notification was given on 8 May 2001, that is to say after the 
Court of First Instance’s Bayer judgment but before the European Court of Justice’s 
answer to the Commission’s appeal. The Commission has rejected Glaxo Wellcome’s 
request for negative clearance or an exemption in the alternative. The Commission’s 
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arguments in rejecting this request have been discussed above in detail. Looking at these 
arguments, it is clearly seen that the Commission has not given up its position against 
prevention of parallel trade in pharmaceuticals. It continues to deem parallel trade as an 
important tool for market integration, it does not believe that pharmaceuticals industry is 
in any way peculiar to justify a derogation from competition rules and it is determined to 
prohibit prevention of parallel trade when the existence of an agreement restricting 
parallel trade cannot be questioned. This approach is also found in one of the speeches of 
Commissioner Monti in which he emphasizes the importance of the fact that in Bayer, the 
Court has not questioned the application of Article 81(1) EC in case of “contractually 
agreed obstacles to parallel trade within the Community”98. What was questioned in 
Bayer was only the existence of an agreement. The CFI agreed with the Commission on 
the need to apply Article 81(1) EC when there is an agreement aiming to impede parallel 
trade. 
4.3.1 Finding of an infringement under Article 81(1) EC 
 
In view of the fact that the Commission’s attitude towards parallel trade has not changed 
when the existence of an agreement cannot be questioned, it is worth discussing the 
possible situations in which the existence of an agreement will not be as obvious. Since 
the CFI found that the Commission has not come up with enough proof to show that a 
control mechanism was established by Bayer, the Commission might be expected to 
collect more evidence to prove the existence of such a mechanism for the next case it will 
have. However, it must be admitted that it will be very hard to trace the destination of the 
products and it will not be easy for the Commission to prove that the manufacturer is 
engaged in such a job. It might be expected that from now on, the pharmaceutical 
companies will be extra careful not to create a situation in which existence of an 
agreement can be claimed by the Commission. Therefore, they would be refraining from 
giving written or oral information to their wholesalers about their new policy. In addition 
they would refrain from establishing a control mechanism for the final destination of their 
products and deciding on how much each wholesaler will be supplied based on whether 
that wholesaler exports the product or not.  
 
98 Monti M, Speech on EC Antitrust Policy in the Pharmaceutical Sector, 26.03.2001, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp2001_013_en.pdf [accessed on 02.06.2005]. 
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As a result, it became harder for the Commission to find an infringement of Article 81(1) 
EC and to stop companies from exercising a restriction of supply with the aim preventing 
parallel trade. This means that the Commission’s vast powers in finding existence of an 
agreement are limited now and this might mean that the Commission will be referring to 
Article 81 EC less in the future in its fight against prevention of parallel trade. 
4.3.2 Further European harmonization 
 
The Commission advocates parallel trade in pharmaceuticals to achieve market 
integration and it aims to achieve market integration to make companies invest more on  
R&D in Europe as well as to improve consumer choices in pharmaceuticals at affordable 
costs. These two objectives may be conflicting, since whereas companies would be 
looking for assurance of higher revenues to invest in R&D, provision of medicines to all 
citizens would require having medicines at the lowest costs as possible. Therefore, just as 
Member States do, the Commission faces a difficult situation in which it needs to find the 
balance between these two contradictory objectives99. The Commission has to consider 
also the characteristics of this sector in striving to achieve a single market.  
 
The Commission has already acknowledged in the 1998 Communication that if the 
Commission leaves the current situation to develop, this would require it to exercise 
important monitoring activities in the market, such as applying the competition rules to 
companies trying to impede parallel trade100. It is stated that this will not be enough to 
improve the global competitiveness of the European pharmaceutical industry. To fight 
against individual cases concerning infringement of Article 81(1) EC without taking any 
steps to change the circumstances creating a lucrative parallel trade business is not going 
to help the European pharmaceutical industry. Therefore, the Commission itself is not 
counting on using Article 81 EC excessively in order to achieve a single market in 
pharmaceuticals.  
 
 
99 1998 Communication, p. 1-2. 
100 1998 Communication, p.10. 
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In the alternative, as already suggested in Bayer, in order to achieve a single market, 
harmonization of prices in the medicinal products by the Community institutions may be 
a solution for correcting distortions caused by different price legislations in Member 
States101. According to Snell102 this does not seem possible for three reasons. First, the 
Commission believes this falls within the competence of the Member States entirely. 
Second, because health care is a politically sensitive area, reaching an agreement between 
Member States will be very difficult. Third, harmonization may be undesirable, since to 
have a uniform legislation may not be the best solution to find the best practice for all in a 
Community of countries with diverse needs and priorities. It is true that full 
harmonization seems unlikely. Although both Snell and Nazzini believe that contrary to 
what the Commission seems to advocate, it has competence under Article 95 and 96 EC 
to correct market distortions in this area103, it seems highly unlikely that the Member 
States will agree on a common position.  
 
In the 1998 Communication, the Commission suggests “staged introduction of normal 
market mechanisms”104. This may entail different levels of harmonization in different 
segments of the market. In the “in-patent products” sector of the market in which there is 
the greatest price control, removal of price control totally is not suggested by the 
Commission. Rather than this, according to the Commission, relaxation of price control 
should be balanced against the benefits of having some control over prices. In this regard, 
also Nazzini points out that the Commission may encourage all Member States to adopt a 
system in which the prices of pharmaceutical products will be negotiated with the 
industry. In this way, the prices will be determined together with the industry in all of the 
Member States and there won’t be such high differences between prices of different 
Member States. Nazzini also indicates that this opportunity was mentioned briefly by the 
Commission in Glaxo105.  
 
101 Bayer, at para 179. 
102 Snell, J., “Free Movement of Pharmaceutical Products: An Overdose of Cheap Drugs?”,  2003, 14 
EBLR 507, p. 520. 
103 Ibid and Nazzini, R., “Parallel Trade in the Pharmaceutical Market”, 2003, 26(1) World Competition 53, 
p. 74. 
104 1998 Communication, p.11. 
105 Glaxo, at recital 132. 
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4.3.3 Dual –pricing of pharmaceuticals 
 
Another way to prevent differences between prices of different Member States may be 
dual-pricing of pharmaceuticals; opening the market to free competition when the goods 
are not purchased or reimbursed by the state. The Commission might be expected to 
encourage this method of imposing relaxation of price controls. This can be done either 
by the undertakings pursuing a dual-pricing policy or by Member States allowing for this 
as a general rule. However, Commission’s decision in Glaxo clearly demonstrates that it 
is against dual-pricing done by manufacturers in agreement with their wholesalers. 
Commission’s decision has been appealed by Glaxo Wellcome.106 The answer of the 
Court in Glaxo will be important to see if its stance will diverge from the Commission’s. 
It will also be important to find out if what is claimed by Rey and Venit is actually true 
and the Court will really – this time explicitly – accept that the economic conditions of 
the pharmaceutical industry necessitate a special exemption for this industry’s efforts to 
prevent parallel trade. It seems like this case will be an opportunity for the CFI to clarify 
the factors underlying its Bayer judgment.  
 
The CFI might force the Commission to provide exemption for dual-pricing systems if it 
accepts Glaxo Wellcome’s arguments in the appeal brought by it. With the appeal, Glaxo 
Wellcome is arguing mainly that the new sales conditions do not constitute an 
infringement of Article 81(1) EC since they are counteracting the distortions to 
competition caused by Spain, and in the alternative is asking for an exemption under 
Article 81(3) EC. This point of view is also supported by Nazzini, who advocates that 
dual-pricing systems of companies should be given an exemption under Article 81(3) 
EC107. According to him, to enable products to compete under free market conditions 
when they are marketed outside public health schemes creates consumer benefits enough 
to justify an exemption. The answer of the CFI will determine the future application of 
Article 81(3) EC. Clearly, the Commission is rejecting this argument. However, at the 
same time it is inviting Member States to make it possible for all the pharmaceutical 
 
106 Case T-168/01 GlaxoWellcome plc v Commission (judgment pending). As a further source see “Action 
brought on 23 July 2001 by Glaxo Wellcome plc against the Commission of the European Communities”, 
OJ C275/17, 29.9.2001. 
107 Nazzini, R., “Parallel Trade in the Pharmaceutical Market”, 2003, 26(1) World Competition 53, p.73. 
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companies to compete in a free market for products neither purchased nor reimbursed by 
the State. This is stated by the Commission in its 2003 Communication108.  
 
It seems that the Commission finds it unacceptable to apply Article 81(3) EC to the 
pharmaceutical sector, but agrees that dual-pricing system is a feasible solution to 
achieving a single market. The Commission might be assuming that to accept to give an 
exemption to an agreement restricting parallel trade in pharmaceuticals might have 
implications for other sectors as well. As mentioned by the Commission in Glaxo, 
pharmaceuticals is not the only sector in which the government exerts control over prices. 
In the other sectors as well, such as the car sector, there is also government influence on 
prices, for instance through tax levels. Manufacturers in the car sector might claim an 
exemption as well for dual-pricing of their products that are going to be exported, based 
on this decision. It is true that government’s involvement in prices would not be the only 
reason behind this exemption and the dual-pricing will not explicitly mean different 
prices will be charged for products to be exported. However, in any case, this will mean 
that dual-pricing of companies with the implicit aim of preventing parallel trade can be 
justified.  
 
Another complication that prevents the Commission from agreeing on an individual 
exemption for dual-pricing may be its possible future implications on the pharmaceutical 
industry. In case the Commission reasons its decision with the particular characteristics 
of the pharmaceutical industry, then it might cause the industry to rely on this declaration 
to ask for an exemption for other (perhaps more severe) restrictions on parallel trade. 
Taking these into consideration, this might be why the Commission preferred to come to 
a solution together with Member States instead. It is also worth noting that this 
communication was adopted by the Commission in response to the report prepared by the 
High Level Group on Innovation and the Provision of Medicines (called “G10 
Medicines”) set up by the Commission109. This solution was proposed by this Group, to 
provide for “more patient choice at a more affordable cost”110, which is the same aim 
 
108 2003 Communication, p. 15-16. 
109 Final report of the G10 Medicines Group, 7.05.2002, available at 
http://pharmacos.eudra.org/F3/g10/docs/G10-Medicines.pdf [accessed on 02.06.2005]. 
110 2003 Communication, p. 15. 
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parallel trade has. Therefore, it is also true that the recent study prepared with the 
contribution of the industry and academicians came up with this solution to increase 
competitiveness of the European pharmaceutical industry, recognizing the Commission’s 
considerations in pursuing a policy favouring parallel trade. 
4.3.4 Use of Article 82 EC 
 
After the European Court of Justice’s judgment was delivered in Commission v Bayer, 
European Association of Euro-Pharmaceutical Companies (EAEPC) made a statement 
that it supported the Commission’s attempts in going after restriction of supply 
practices111. What was noteworthy about this statement was that it mentioned about more 
than 40 complaints about supply quota systems were made before the Commission and 
asked the Commission to handle them under Article 82 EC as well as Article 81 EC.  
 
It is true that the Commission has never taken a decision on infringement of Article 82 
EC in the pharmaceutical industry up to now. The only case brought so far before the 
ECJ about the use of Article 82 EC was the Syfait112 case in which the Greek 
Competition Authority was asking for a preliminary ruling. In this case, the Greek 
pharmaceutical wholesalers are accusing Glaxosmithkline of infringing Article 82 EC 
Treaty by restricting supplies of its three proprietary medicinal products to the Greek 
wholesalers. Greek Competition Authority is asking the ECJ whether a dominant firm’s 
refusal to supply in full the orders of the pharmaceutical wholesalers would amount to an 
abuse and how is it possible to assess when a conduct of a dominant pharmaceutical firm 
is abusive. Unfortunately the ECJ has concluded just very recently that the Greek 
Competition Authority did not have the characteristics of a national court and therefore 
did not accept the case as admissible. This caused disappointment in the industry, which 
was waiting for the answer with much interest to clarify the possibility of using Article 
82 EC in order to prevent parallel trade of pharmaceuticals113. However, Advocate 
 
111 EAEPC Press Statement, 06.01.2004, available at  
http://www.eaepc.org/news_and_press/press_releases.php?n=3&start=5&id=31 [accessed on 02.06.2005]. 
112 Case C-53/03 Synetairismos Farmakopoion Aitolias & Akarnaias (Syfait) and Others v Glaxosmithkline 
AEVE  [2005] (not yet reported) (hereinafter: “Syfait”). 
113 The decision of the ECJ not to answer the preliminary reference questions caused disappointment for 
both the wholesalers engaged in parallel trade and the innovative pharmaceutical manufacturers. See 
EAEPC Press Statement, 31.05.2005, available at 
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General Jacobs had delivered his opinion on 28 October 2004 and considering the case as 
admissible, has made very important contributions to the debate whether refusal to supply 
by a dominant firm in order to prevent parallel trade should be considered as abusive.  
 
Article 82 EC prohibits undertakings that have a dominant position in the market from 
abusing their position. In order to evaluate whether Article 82 EC can be used by the 
Commission to pursue companies that intend to prevent parallel trading of their products, 
the individual elements of Article 82 EC should be examined; the relevant market, 
dominance and what constitutes an abuse. To begin with, identifying the relevant market 
is very important in order to determine the dominance. Unfortunately, in Advocate 
General Jacobs’s opinion, the dominance of Glaxo in the relevant market has been taken 
as granted, and neither the definition of the relevant market nor the dominance has been 
elaborated by Jacobs. In this respect and since also the Commission has not yet adopted a 
decision based on Article 82 EC in the pharmaceutical sector, the only case law we have 
at hand is in the field of merger control. In merger control cases, the relevant market is 
determined by the Commission based on the products’ therapeutic effects. However, 
according to the Commission’s Notice on the Definition of the Relevant Market114, the 
main purpose of market definition is to identify the competitive constraints.115 Therefore, 
as Van Kerckhove states, merger cases and cases examining Article 82 EC do not pose 
similar competitive constraints to be able to define the market similarly116. Some other 
methods should be used in defining the market for cases examining undertakings under 
Article 82 EC. 
 
According to the Notice, the first step in determining the relevant market is to establish 
the products that are substitutable with each other for the consumer, in terms of their 
price, characteristics and intended use117. According to a study undertaken by EFPIA, a 
 
http://www.eaepc.org/news_and_press/press_releases.php?n=3&id=246  and Press release of EFPIA on 
31.05.2005, available at http://www.efpia.org/3_press/20050531.htm for further details [accessed on 
02.06.2005]. 
114 Notice on the Definition of the Relevant Market for the Purposes of Community Competition Law, OJ 
[1997] C372/5 (hereinafter: “the Notice”). 
115 the Notice, at para 2. 
116 Van Kerckhove, M., “Parallel Trade in Pharmaceutical Products Following the ECJ’s Bayer Judgment: 
Can a Case Be Made Under Article 82 EC Treaty?”, 2005, available at 
http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/ear/eu_pharma.cfm [accessed on 02.06.2005]. 
117 the Notice, at para 36. 
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very important question regarding the pharmaceutical products is to take the wholesalers 
as the buyers or the national health authority118. As mentioned above, the peculiar 
characteristics of the pharmaceutical industry permits both of them to be treated as 
buyers. However, because these two buyers have very different priorities in buying the 
product, what they would consider as substitutes changes. The national health authorities 
and doctors would consider the therapeutic effects of the pharmaceutical product, 
whereas the wholesalers would take into account the profitability margin – the price 
difference between the two products in deciding on the substitutes.  According to national 
health authorities, the market definition becomes similar to the market definition the 
Commission uses for merger cases. If this product market definition is accepted, the 
geographical market should then be taken as the national market of each Member State, 
since the national health authorities’ reimbursement systems and pricing differ in each 
Member State119. In contrast to national health authorities, the wholesalers would define 
the market as all the pharmaceutical products capable of profitable parallel trade. This 
view is advocated by Jenny in his paper presented before the Hellenic Competition 
Authorities120. According to Jenny, all pharmaceutical products, for which there exist 
price differences in different Member States big enough to cover the costs of parallel 
trade constitute the relevant market. This would make the geographical market all the 
importing countries in which the wholesaler is able to conduct parallel trade.  
 
In defining the relevant market for cases in the pharmaceutical sector, another difficulty 
arises in using the SSNIP test method, which is also included in the Notice. This test aims 
to assess the buyer’s reaction to the price increase in the product and whether or not the 
supplier would find it profitable to increase the price between 5 and 10 % above the 
good’s price. It assumes both that the supplier would be able to increase the price as 
much as it wants and that the buyer would decide on its own which product to buy. Since, 
both of these assumptions are not correct in the pharmaceutical sector, to use the SSNIP 
 
118 EFPIA, “Article 82 EC: Can It Be Applied to Control Sales By Pharmaceutical Manufacturers to 
Wholesalers?”, November 2004, available at http://www.efpia.org/6_publ/Article82ECNov04.pdf  
(hereinafter: “EFPIA’s study”) [accessed on 02.06.2005]. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Jenny, F., "Pharmaceuticals Competition and Free Movement of Goods", paper presented to the Hellenic 
Competition Authorities EU competition law and policy conference, 19.04.2002, p.6. 
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test is not possible. Therefore, as also it is pointed out in the EFPIA’s study, in 
identifying the relevant market, SSNIP test cannot be used as a “reliable method”121. 
 
After identifying the relevant market, dominance of the undertakings should be 
examined. In EU case law, the definition of dominance is “a position of economic 
strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to hinder the maintenance of 
effective competition on the relevant market by allowing it to behave to an appreciable 
extent independently of its competitors and customers and ultimately of consumers”122. 
In the pharmaceutical sector, dominance should be assessed in two relevant markets that 
were identified before. Therefore, first, dominance in the relevant market identified 
according to the products’ therapeutic effects will be examined and secondly the 
dominance in the relevant market proposed by Jenny will be elaborated. 
 
Although the market share constitutes the starting point of analysis, other factors are 
more determinative. A relatively high market share does not necessarily have to mean 
that the undertaking would be able to act independently. In the first relevant market, since 
the price is controlled in this highly regulated sector, the manufacturers are not in a 
position to decide independently on their prices and profit margins. Therefore, as also 
stated in the EFPIA’s study, the dominance cannot be assessed by the ability of the 
undertakings to increase prices independent of their competitors123. This view is shared 
by Van Kerckhove, who concludes that it would be “difficult” to establish dominance of 
an undertaking if the relevant market is defined as such124. 
 
In the second relevant market, it must be examined whether the manufacturing 
pharmaceutical firms are able to act independently and restrict the competition. The 
constraint on determining the price is relevant also for this definition of the market. 
Furthermore, EFPIA’s study shows that the manufacturers of pharmaceuticals were not 
able to prevent activities of parallel traders by taking restrictive actions. EFPIA’s study 
refers to a research conducted by the Commission, which establishes that the business of 
 
121 EFPIA’s study, p. 5. 
122 Case 27/76 United Brands v Commission [1978] ECR I-207. 
123 EFPIA’s study, p. 7. 
124 Supra note 116. 
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the wholesalers was not affected by the unilateral supply quotas of the manufacturing 
undertakings125.  
 
After these findings, both Van Kerckhove and EFPIA’s study conclude that the in 
whatever relevant market definition is chosen, the dominance of the undertakings cannot 
be established, since the undertakings are not in a position to act independent of 
competitive constraints. Glynn does not share this view and after establishing that in 
general in the pharmaceutical sector, the purchasing power of the customer is strong, 
there is high degree of regulation and price control and there are high barriers to entry 
and exit, deduces that in this situation both the supplier and the buyer have dominant 
positions 126. Glynn points out that Article 82 EC can be successfully used against the 
abusive behaviours of the undertakings. 
 
If Glynn’s view is accepted and it is established that dominance of the pharmaceutical 
companies can be maintained in the relevant market, the next issue to be considered in 
examining the case under Article 82 EC is the existence of abuse. What is prohibited by 
Article 82 EC is not the dominance but the abuse of dominance by the dominant 
undertaking. In Bayer judgment, the CFI has concluded that "The case law of the Court 
of Justice indirectly recognises the importance of safeguarding free enterprise when 
applying the competition rules of the Treaty where it expressly acknowledges that even 
an undertaking in a dominant position may, in certain cases, refuse to sell or change its 
supply or delivery policy without falling under the prohibition laid down in Article 
82."127  
 
Advocate General Jacobs has agreed with the CFI’s statement in his opinion and affirmed 
that “a dominant pharmaceutical undertaking which restricts the supply of its products 
does not necessarily abuse its dominant position within the meaning of Article 82 EC 
merely because of its intention thereby to limit parallel trade”. After examining the case 
law, Jacobs has made three conclusions. First, the dominant firm has an obligation to 
 
125 EFPIA’s study, p. 7. 
126 Glynn, D., “Article 82 and Price Discrimination in Patented Pharmaceuticals: the Economics”, 2005, 3 
ECLR 136. 
127 Bayer, at para 180. 
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supply its products or services in order not to harm competition in very exceptional 
cases128. Secondly, the dominant firm is not obliged to meet in full the orders which are 
out of the ordinary to defend its commercial interests129. Thirdly, what determines 
whether a dominant firm has the obligation to supply or does not have to supply is the 
specific economic and regulatory context of the case130.  
 
Jacobs goes on to clarify the criteria to be used in order to understand when a conduct can 
be considered abusive. In this analysis, Jacobs takes into account the specific 
characteristics of the pharmaceutical sector; such as the regulation of price and 
distribution, the impact of parallel trade on the innovative pharmaceutical industry and 
the consequences of parallel trade for consumers and purchasers in the importing 
Member State. Jacobs concludes that a restriction of supply by a dominant firm in order 
to prevent parallel trade is objectively justifiable, reasonable and proportionate to defend 
the undertaking’s commercial interests. However, he makes it clear that this conclusion is 
strictly related only to the pharmaceutical industry in its present condition and the 
characteristics of the specific case131. Furthermore, Jacobs emphasizes that if the refusal 
to supply by a dominant pharmaceutical firm results in any other negative consequences 
for competition other than restriction of parallel trade, the Court may find an abuse132. 
 
Jacobs has made a significant contribution to the arguments of the innovative 
pharmaceutical industrialists, by considering the economic arguments they were also 
defending against parallel trade as decisive in finding out whether a dominant 
pharmaceutical firm’s refusal to supply is abusive or not. It might be assumed that the 
Commission would take this Opinion into account although the ECJ has answered the 
questions neither in line with the Advocate General’s Opinion nor against it. Given the 
previously examined difficulties in establishing the relevant market and dominance in the 
pharmaceutical sector, the Commission might be expected not to refer excessively to 
Article 82 EC instead of Article 81(1) EC. 
 
128 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Case C-53/03 Synetairismos Farmakopoion Aitolias & Akarnaias 
(Syfait) and Others v Glaxosmithkline AEVE delivered on 28 October 2004, (hereinafter “Syfait Opinion”), 
at para 66.  
129 Syfait Opinion, at para 67. 
130 Syfait Opinion, at para 68. 
131 Syfait Opinion, at para 101. 
132 Syfait Opinion, at para 104. 
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In one of his speeches, Commissioner Monti touches upon the increasing possibility of 
using Article 82 EC in the pharmaceutical industry in the future133. However, he 
mentions only the use of intellectual rights of companies to create entry barriers as the 
abusive practice under examination of the Commission. Furthermore, Commissioner 
Monti considers the misuse of intellectual property rights as “the most thorny” topic of 
the competition related topics of pharmaceutical industry. Therefore, it seems that the 
Commission is preoccupied with this aspect of abuse of dominance rather than prevention 
of parallel trade. Moreover the Commission cannot consider Article 82 EC as an 
alternative to Article 81 EC in order to prevent impediments to parallel trade.  
5. IMPLICATIONS OF THE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ON THE 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY IN TURKEY 
 
Since the analysis of the role of Articles 81 and 82 EC in preventing manufacturing 
pharmaceutical firms from restricting parallel trade will be very much limited in the 
future, the opening of the Turkish market to parallel trade of pharmaceuticals would not 
result in increase of exports. The multinational manufacturers would be free to take 
strictly unilateral actions to prevent this parallel trade, or the dominant manufacturers 
would be able to impose restrictions of supply in order to protect their commercial 
interests. 
 
It is understood that Turkish pharmaceuticals sector needs to take further radical 
measures in order to increase its competitiveness. The foremost impediment against the 
sector’s competitiveness is the strict price control that the government exercises. Price 
control is an issue for many of the EU Member States as well; however, the trend is 
towards liberalisation of the prices. Some Member States such as Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Germany, UK and Finland have already chosen to have relatively liberal 
prices. Other countries such as Spain and Italy have no price control on pharmaceuticals 
sold without prescription134. This trend of exerting no price control on pharmaceuticals 
that are not prescribed and to be reimbursed is also supported by the Commission.  
 
133 Supra note 98. 
134 Supra note 12, p.41. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
Single European Act entered into force on 1 July 1987. It laid down a rather ambitious 
plan for the final achievement of a single market. The first decision applying Article 
81(1) EC to the pharmaceutical sector was taken on 13 July 1987135. Therefore, it 
coincides with the times the Community’s focus was on market integration. This decision 
was aiming to eliminate the obstacles to parallel trade in pharmaceuticals using 
infringement of Article 81(1) EC and its ultimate aim was achieving market integration 
through parallel trade. When it was appealed in the European Court of Justice, the 
Commission’s approach was upheld by the ECJ in Sandoz. 
 
On 2 March 1994 the Commission outlined the main framework for an industrial policy 
for the European pharmaceutical industry in a communication136. In this Communication, 
the Commission’s concern about the weakening competitiveness of the industry was 
pronounced. In the light of these findings, steps were taken to increase its 
competitiveness. However, in the 1998 Communication it is stated that further steps are 
needed. Pharmaceutical industry is an important industry in Europe, with its contribution 
to the economy and trade balance, the number of people employed in it and the social 
aspects. It is important to keep it competitive while at the same time enabling all 
European citizens access to safe and technically developed drugs at affordable costs. This 
is also what the Commission aims. It envisages parallel trade as an important tool in this 
respect. Therefore the Commission advocates preservation of parallel trade by all means 
despite the industry’s claims that the conditions of the very much regulated 
pharmaceutical industry does not allow for the established benefits of the parallel trade to 
be seen in this sector. The Court, who supported the Commission in Sandoz, gave a 
judgment in Bayer which seemed to depart from the Commission for the first time.  
 
It seems that the CFI’s considerations were about finding existence of an agreement and 
not on the particular situation of pharmaceutical industry against parallel trade. The result 
is that this judgment made it possible for the pharmaceutical companies to prevent 
parallel trading of their products by exercising strictly unilateral restriction of supply 
 
135 Supra note 48. 
136 Supra note 20. 
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policy. There might be some other underlying considerations that the CFI took into 
account in giving this judgment. These are not maintained explicitly by the CFI in Bayer 
judgment. Therefore, it is expected to get answers in the CFI’s judgment for the appeal of 
the Commission’s Glaxo decision. 
 
Certainly the pharmaceutical industry is right in arguing for the special characteristics of 
this industry for their position against parallel trade. It is true that the prices are regulated 
intensively by the Member States, with every Member State having a different priority. In 
the words of the Commissioner Monti pharmaceutical industry is “a truly global industry 
operating in distinct national markets”137. To open up this industry, in which the rules of 
competition are not operating, to free competition might result in parallel traders getting 
most of the benefit and harming the R&D based industry.  
 
These considerations result in the impossibility of preventing parallel trade through 
competition rules. In this sector, which has very specific conditions, the parallel trade will 
be able to be limited by the manufacturers. In this respect, and in the absence of any 
foreseeable harmonization at the Community level, the best solution seems to be opening 
the market of medicinal products that are neither purchased nor reimbursed by the State 
to free competition. This was also the policy adopted and the suggestion made by the 
Commission in its 2003 Communication. This should be the policy adopted by the 
Turkish pharmaceuticals industry as well. 
 
137 Supra note 28. 
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